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A Formal Characterization of the Outcomes
of Rule-Based Argumentation Systems
Leila Amgoud and Philippe Besnard
IRIT – CNRS
118, route de Narbonne
31062, Toulouse Cedex 09
Abstract. Rule-based argumentation systems are developed for reasoning about
defeasible information. As a major feature, their logical language distinguishes
between strict rules and defeasible ones. This paper presents the first study on
the outcomes of such systems under various semantics such as naive, stable, pre-
ferred, ideal and grounded. For each of these semantics, it characterizes both the
extensions and the set of plausible inferences drawn by these systems under a few
intuitive postulates.
1 Introduction
There are two major categories of instantiations of Dung’s abstract argumentation
framework [4]. A category uses deductive logics (such as propositional logic [2,6] or
Tarskian logics [1]). The second category uses rule-based languages [3,5,7] which dis-
tinguish between facts, strict rules (they encode strict information), and defeasible rules
(they describe general behavior with exceptional cases). Despite the popularity of rule-
based argumentation systems, the results they return have not been characterized yet.
The following questions are still open:
– what are the underpinnings of the extensions under various semantics?
– do Dung’s semantics return different results as at the abstract level?
– what is the number of extensions a system may have under a given semantics?
– what are the plausible conclusions with such systems?
In this paper, we answer all the above questions. We start with a knowledge base
called a theory (a set of facts, a set of strict rules and a set of defeasible rules), we
define a notion of a derivation schema which we use to generate arguments from the
theory. For the sake of generality, the attack relation is left unspecified. We extend the
list of postulates proposed in [3] with three new postulates. We investigate outputs of
rule-based argumentation systems that satisfy all the postulates. We show that naive ex-
tensions return maximal options of the theory (an option being a sub-theory that gathers
all the facts and strict rules, and a maximal -up to consistency- set of defeasible rules
that do not conflict with the strict part). Every maximal option gives birth to a naive
extension. Furthermore, the set of plausible conclusions under the naive semantics con-
tains all the conclusions that are drawn from all the maximal options. Stable extensions
return maximal options but not necessarily all of them, it depends on the attack relation
at work. Should not all maximal options be picked as stable extensions, defining an at-
tack relation that discard exactly the spurious ones turns out be tricky. The same results
hold for preferred semantics. We characterize both ideal and grounded extensions.
2 Rule-Based Argumentation Systems
In what follows, we consider the language used in [3]. Let L is a set of literals, i.e.,
atoms or negation of atoms. The negation of an atom x from L is denoted ¬x. Three
kinds of information (x, x1...xn denoting literals in L) are distinguished:
– Facts, which are elements of L
– Strict rules, which are of the form x1, . . . , xn → x
– Defeasible rules, which are of the form x1, . . . , xn ⇒ x
Throughout the text, rules are named r1, r2, . . . For each rule r = x1, . . . , xn → x
(as well as r = x1, . . . , xn ⇒ x), the head of the rule is Head(r) = x and the body
of the rule is Body(r) = {x1, . . . , xn}. A strict rule expresses general information that
has no exception, e.g. “penguins cannot fly” whereas a defeasible rule expresses general
information that may have exceptions, e.g. “birds can fly”.
Definition 1 (Theory). A theory is a triple T = (F ,S,D) where F is a set of facts
and S (resp. D) is a set of strict (resp. defeasible) rules.
Notation. Let T = (F ,S,D) and let T ′ = (F ′,S ′,D′) be two theories. We say that
T is a sub-theory of T ′, written T ⊑ T ′, iff F ⊆ F ′ and S ⊆ S′ and D ⊆ D′. The
relation ⊏ is the strict version of ⊑ (i.e., it is the case that at least one of the three
inclusions is strict).
The notion of consistency is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Consistency). A set X ⊆ L is consistent iff ∄x, y ∈ X s.t. x = ¬y. It is
inconsistent otherwise.
Assumption 1. The body of every (strict/defeasible) rule is finite and not empty. More-
over, for each rule r, Body(r) ∪ {Head(r)} is consistent. We say that r is consistent.
The notion of a derivation schema generalizes derivations as defined in [5,8] and
others. It shows how literals can follow from a theory.
Definition 3 (Derivation schema). Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory and x ∈ L. A
derivation schema for x from T is a finite sequence d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 s.t.
– xn = x
– for i = 1 . . . n,
• xi ∈ F and ri = ∅, or
• ri ∈ S ∪D and Head(ri) = xi and Body(ri) ⊆ {x1, .., xi−1}
Seq(d) = {x1, . . . , xn}.
Facts(d) = {xi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri = ∅}.
Strict(d) = {ri | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri ∈ S}.
Def(d) = {ri | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri ∈ D}.
Notation. In order to improve readability, we somehow abuse the notation in derivation
schemata: We use the name of the rules instead of the rules themselves.
A derivation schema is not necessarily consistent (such as (7) below), as it may
contain opposite literals in the form xi = ¬xj for some i and j (this is in accordance
with Definition 2).
Example 1. Consider T1 such that F1, S1, D1 are as follows.
F1
{
p
q
S1


p → s (r1)
q → ¬s (r2)
p, s→ u (r3)
D1


¬s ⇒ t (r4)
t, u⇒ ¬v (r5)
p ⇒ q (r6)
Each of (1)–(7) below is a derivation schema from T1
〈(p, ∅)〉 (1)
〈(q, ∅), (¬s, r2)〉 (2)
〈(p, ∅), (s, r1), (u, r3)〉 (3)
〈(p, ∅), (s, r1), (p, ∅), (u, r3)〉 (4)
〈(p, ∅), (q, ∅), (s, r1), (u, r3)〉 (5)
〈(p, ∅), (q, r6), (¬s, r2)〉 (6)
〈(p, ∅), (q, ∅), (¬s, r2), (s, r1), (u, r3), (t, r4), (¬v, r5)〉 (7)
A derivation schema may not be (⊆-)minimal. There are two reasons for that:
– repeating pairs (xi, ri) as in derivation (4) ((p, ∅) is repeated twice),
– involving literals that do not serve towards inferring the conclusion x, as is illus-
trated by (5) (q is of no use there). The derivation schema fails thus to be focussed.
Definition 4 (Minimal/focussed derivation schema). A derivation schema for x from
T is minimal iff none of its proper subsequences is a derivation schema for x from T . It
is focussed iff it can be reduced to a minimal one by just deleting repeated pairs (xi, ri).
Property 1. Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory. A derivation schema d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . ,
(xn, rn)〉 from T is minimal iff d is focussed and the literals x1, . . . , xn are pairwise
distinct.
Notation. CN(T ) denotes the set of all literals that have a derivation schema from T .
We call CN(T ) the potential consequences drawn from T (for short, consequences)
but they need not be definitive as they may be dismissed by opposite conclusions.
Property 2. Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory.
– F ⊆ CN(T ) ⊆ F ∪ {Head(r) | r ∈ S ∪ D} ⊆ L
– If T is finite, then CN(T ) is finite
– F = ∅ iff CN(T ) = ∅
– If d is a derivation schema from T , Seq(d) ⊆ CN(T )
Some rules may not be activated (i.e., their body has no derivation schema). Let us
consider the following example.
Example 2. Let T2 = (F2,S2,D2) such that
F2
{
p
q
S2


p→ t (r1)
q → t (r2)
s → u (r3)
D2
{
p ⇒ q (r4)
u⇒ v (r5)
There are rules here whose head is not a consequence of T2. CN(T2) = {p, q, t} ⊂
{p, q, t, u, v} = F2 ∪ Head(S2 ∪ D2).
It is also easy to show that CN is monotonic.
Property 3. If T ⊑ T ′ then CN(T ) ⊆ CN(T ′).
The backbone of an argumentation system is naturally the notion of arguments. They
are built from a theory using the notion of derivation schema as follows.
Definition 5 (Argument). Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory. An argument defined from
T is a pair (d, x) s.t.
– x ∈ L
– d is a derivation schema for x from T
– Seq(d) is consistent
– ∄T ′ ⊏ (Facts(d), Strict(d), Def(d)) s.t. x ∈ CN(T ′)
An argument (d, x) is strict iff Def(d) = ∅.
Notation. If a = (d, x) is an argument then Conc(a) = x. For a set E of arguments,
Concs(E) = {x | (d, x) ∈ E}. Arg(T ) is the set of all the arguments defined from
T . For a set E of arguments,
Th(E) = (
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Facts(d),
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Strict(d),
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Def(d)).
Theorem 1. Let T be a theory. For all consistent sequence d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉
from T , the following two statements are equivalent:
– (d, x) is an argument (from T )
– d is a focussed derivation schema from T s.t. x = xn
Definition 6 (Sub-argument). An argument (d, x) is a sub-argument of (d′, x′) iff
(Facts(d), Strict(d), Def(d)) ⊑ (Facts(d′), Strict(d′), Def(d′)).
Notation Sub(a) denotes the set of all sub-arguments of a.
Example 1 (Cont). The argument (〈(q, ∅), (¬s, r2)〉,¬s) has two sub-arguments:
(〈(q, ∅)〉, q) and itself. By contrast, (〈(q, ∅)〉, q) is not a sub-argument of (〈(p, ∅),
(q, r6)〉, q).
Clearly, if (d, x) is a sub-argument of (d′, x′) then Seq(d) ⊆ Seq(d′), but the con-
verse is not true as shown next.
Example 2 (Cont). Argumentsa=(〈(p, ∅), (t, r1)〉, t) and b=(〈(p, ∅), (q, r4), (t, r2)〉, t)
are s.t. Seq(a) = {p, t} ⊆ {p, q, t} = Seq(b) but a is not a sub-argument of b.
From the monotonicity of CN, it follows that the construction of arguments is a mono-
tonic process.
Proposition 1. If T ⊑ T ′ then Arg(T ) ⊆ Arg(T ′).
An argumentation system is defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Argumentation system). An argumentation system (AS for short) de-
fined over a theory T = (F ,S,D) is a pair H = (Arg(T ),R) where R ⊆ Arg(T ) ×
Arg(T ) is called an attack relation.
In what follows, arguments are evaluated using semantics proposed in [4]. Before
recalling them, let us first introduce the two requirements on which they are based.
Definition 8 (Conflict-freeness – Defence). Let H = (A, R) be an AS, E ⊆ A and
a ∈ A.
– E is conflict-free iff ∄a, b ∈ E s.t. aR b.
– E defends a iff ∀b ∈ A, if bR a then ∃c ∈ E s.t. c R b.
Definition 9 recalls the semantics of interest in the sequel.
Definition 9 (Acceptability semantics). Let H = (A,R) be an AS and E ⊆ A.
– E is a naive extensions iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. set ⊆) conflict-free set.
– E is an admissible set iff it is conflict-free and defends all its elements.
– E is a preferred extension iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. set ⊆) admissible set.
– E is a stable extension iff it is conflict-free and ∀a ∈ A \ E , ∃b ∈ E s.t. bR a.
– E is a grounded extension iff it is a minimal (w.r.t. set ⊆) set that is admissible and
contains any argument it defends.
– E is an ideal extension iff it is the maximal (w.r.t. set⊆) admissible set which is part
of any preferred extension.
Notation. Extx(H) denotes the set of all the extensions of a systemH under semantics
x where x ∈ {n, p, s} and n (resp. p, s) stands for naive (resp. preferred, stable).
Plausible conclusions are those common to all extensions.
Definition 10 (Plausible conclusions). If H = (Arg(T ),R) is an AS built over a the-
ory T , the set of plausible conclusions of H is
Output(H) =
⋂
Ei∈Extx(H)
Concs(Ei).
From the above definitions, namely that of an argument, it follows that the plausible
conclusions of an argumentation system are a subset of the consequences that follow
wrt CN from the theory over which the system is built.
Property 4. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over T . Output(H) ⊆ CN(T ).
3 Postulates for Argumentation Systems
We present rationality postulates that any rule-based argumentation system should sat-
isfy. The first two were already proposed in [3] and the others are new. The first postulate
ensures that the set of conclusions of arguments of each extension is consistent. This is
compatible with the fact that each extension represents a coherent position.
Postulate 1 (Consistency). Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over a theory T . For
all E ∈ Extx(H), Concs(E) is consistent. We say that H satisfies consistency.
It was shown in [3] that if an argumentation system H satisfies consistency, then its
set Output(H) of plausible conclusions is consistent as well.
Property 5 ([3]). If an AS H satisfies consistency, then Output(H) is consistent.
The second postulate ensures that the extensions of an argumentation system are
closed under strict rules. The idea is that if there is an argument with conclusion x in
an extension and there exists a strict rule x→ y, then y should also be supported by an
argument in the same extension.
Postulate 2 (Closure under strict rules). Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an AS built over a
theory T . For all E ∈ Extx(H), Concs(E) = CN((Concs(E),S, ∅)). We say that H is
closed under strict rules.
It is known that if an argumentation system H is closed under strict rules, then its set
Output(H) is necessarily closed under strict rules.
Property 6 ([3]). Let H be an AS built over a theory T = (F ,S,D). If H is closed
under strict rules, then Output(H) = CN((Output(H),S, ∅)).
It was also shown in [3] that a system that satisfies consistency and closure under
strict rules satisfies indirect consistency.
Property 7 ([3]). Let H be an AS built over a theory T = (F ,S,D). If H satisfies con-
sistency and is closed under strict rules, then for all E ∈ Extx(H), CN((Concs(E),S, ∅))
is consistent.
We propose three new postulates. The first says that if an argument belongs to an ex-
tension, then all its sub-arguments should be in the extension. It means that an argument
cannot be accepted in an extension if one of its sub-parts is rejected.
Postulate 3 (Closure under sub-arguments). Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an AS built
over a theory T . For all E ∈ Extx(H), if a ∈ E then Sub(a) ⊆ E . We say that H is
closed under sub-arguments.
The following result characterizes the extensions of an argumentation system which
is closed under sub-arguments.
Proposition 2. If an AS H is closed under sub-arguments, then ∀E ∈ Extx(H),
– Concs(E) = CN(Th(E))
– ∀(d, x) ∈ Arg(Th(E)), Seq(d) ⊆ Concs(E)
Importantly, even when a system is closed under sub-arguments, the equality E =
Arg(Th(E)) is not always true. This depends on the semantics as we will see later.
Proposition 3. If an argumentation system H satisfies consistency and closure under
sub-arguments, then ∀E ∈ Extx(H), CN(Th(E)) is consistent.
Since facts and strict rules are the “hard” part in a theory, it is natural that any strict
argument should be in all extensions. This principle is applied in default logic [9].
Postulate 4 (Strict precedence). Let H be an AS built over a theory T = (F ,S,D).
For all E ∈ Extx(H), Arg((F ,S, ∅)) ⊆ E . We say that H satisfies strict precedence.
We show next that every argumentation system satisfying Postulate 4 infers all the
conclusions that follow from the set of facts and the strict rules of a theory.
Proposition 4. Let H be an AS built over a theory T = (F ,S,D). If H satisfies strict
precedence, then F ⊆ CN((F ,S, ∅)) ⊆ Output(H).
Next is an important result for the rest of our study: it says that if an argumentation
system over a theory T satisfies Postulates 2, 3, 4, then the set of literals deduced from
Th(E), the theory of an extension E , is exactly the one obtained from Th(E) extended
by all facts and strict rules of T which are not in Th(E).
Proposition 5. Let H be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F ,S,D).
If H satisfies postulates 2, 3, 4, then for all E ∈ Extx(H),
CN(Th(E)) = CN((F ,S,
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Def(d))).
The last postulate ensures a form of completeness of the extensions. It says that if the
sequence of an argument is part of the conclusions of a given extension, then the argu-
ment (Definition 5 ensures consistency) should belong to the extension. Informally: If
each step in the argument is good enough to be in the extension, then so is the argument
itself.
Postulate 5 (Exhaustiveness). Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over a theory
T = (F ,S,D). For all E ∈ Extx(H), for all (d, x) ∈ Arg(T ), if Seq(d) ⊆ Concs(E),
then (d, x) ∈ E .
The extensions (under any semantics) of any argumentation system that satisfies ex-
haustiveness and closure under sub-arguments are closed in terms of arguments.
Proposition 6. If an AS H is closed under sub-arguments and satisfies the exhaustive-
ness postulate, then ∀E ∈ Extx(H), E = Arg(Th(E)).
Under some semantics like naive and stable, Postulate 5 follows from consistency
and closure under sub-arguments. This is mostly the case when the attack relation is
conflict-dependent, that is, it captures the inconsistency of the theory over which the
argumentation system is built.
Definition 11 (Conflict-dependency). LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation sys-
tem. The attack relation R is conflict-dependent iff for all (d, x), (d′, x′) ∈ Arg(T ), if
(d, x) R (d′, x′) then Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d′) is inconsistent.
Proposition 7. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a the-
ory T s.t. R is conflict-dependent. If H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-
arguments, then H satisfies exhaustiveness under naive and stable semantics.
Finally, it is worth noticing that conflict-dependent relations do not admit self-
attacking arguments.
Proposition 8. Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system. If R is conflict-
dependent, ∀a ∈ Arg(T ) (a, a) /∈ R.
4 Outcomes of Argumentation Systems
This section analyzes the outputs of rule-based argumentation systems under the se-
mantics recalled in Def. 9. In the sequel, we consider only systems that satisfy the
postulates introduced in Section 3. As in [3,5,9], we assume that the “hard” part of a
theory is consistent. Formally:
Assumption 2. For all theory T = (F ,S,D), CN((F ,S, ∅)) is consistent.
Let us first introduce a key concept: that of an option.
Definition 12 (Option). Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory. An option of T is a sub-theory
T ′ = (F ′,S ′,D′) of T such that:
– F ′ = F and S ′ = S (hence D′ ⊆ D)
– CN(T ′) is consistent
– ∀r ∈ D \ D′, CN((F ,S,D′ ∪ {r})) is inconsistent.
Let Opt(T ) denote the set of all options of T .
Example 3. Consider T3 such that F3, S3, D3 are as follows.
F3


p
q
¬s
S3
{
t, u, v → s (r1) D3


p ⇒ t (r2)
q ⇒ u (r3)
u⇒ v (r4)
The theory T3 has three options:
– O1 = (F3,S3, {p⇒ t, q ⇒ u})
– O2 = (F3,S3, {p⇒ t, u⇒ v})
– O3 = (F3,S3, {q ⇒ u, u⇒ v})
When a theory is consistent, it has a unique option: itself. This is the case in Example
2: Opt(T2) = {T2}.
Property 8. Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory.
– Opt(T ) = {T } iff CN(T ) is consistent.
– If CN((F ,S, ∅)) is inconsistent, then Opt(T ) = ∅.
– For all r ∈ D, if CN((F ,S, {r})) is consistent, then there exists an option O s.t.
(F ,S, {r}) ⊑ O.
Note that the set of consequences of an option is not necessarily maximal for set
inclusion as shown by Example 3.
Example 3 (Cont). We have CN(O1) = {p, q,¬s, t, u}, CN(O2) = {p, q,¬s, t}, and
CN(O3) = {p, q,¬s, u, v}. Thus, CN(O2) ⊆ CN(O1).
Notation For a set B of theories, we denote its maximum as Max(B) = {T ∈ B |
∄T ′ ∈ B s.t. CN(T ) ⊂ CN(T ′)}. In Example 3, Max(Opt(T3)) = {O1,O3}.
The defeasible rules of a theory do not necessarily belong to an option of the theory
as shown by the following example.
Example 4. The theory T4 s.t. F4 = {p, q}, S4 = {p → s} and D4 = {q ⇒ ¬s} has
a single option: O = (F4,S4, ∅).
4.1 Naive Semantics
We start by characterizing the naive extensions of any argumentation system satisfying
the above rationality postulates. We show that each naive extension returns a maximal
option of the theory over which the system is built.
Theorem 2. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, and 4. For all E ∈ Extn(H), there
exists a uniqueO ∈ Max(Opt(T )) such that Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).
Note that the theory of a naive extension may be a proper subset of the corresponding
maximal option. This is mainly due to the fact that an option may contain non-activated
rules while arguments are minimal and thus focussed.
Example 2 (Cont). Since theory T2 is consistent, then it has a single (maximal) option
which is the theory itself. Any AS built over T2 and which obeys the postulates and
whose attack relation is conflict-dependent will have a single naive extension E with
Th(E) = (F , {r1, r2}, {r5}) ⊏ T2. Rules r3 and r5 are not used in arguments.
Notation For E naive extension of H s.t. O in Max(Opt(T )) satisfies Th(E) ⊑ O and
Concs(E) = CN(O), let Option(E) def= O.
We prove that no two naive extensions return the same option. Moreover, naive exten-
sions are closed in terms of arguments.
Theorem 3. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, and 4.
– For all E , E ′ ∈ Extn(H), if Option(E) = Option(E ′), then E = E ′
– For all E ∈ Extn(H), E = Arg(Option(E))
We have shown that each naive extension captures exactly one maximal option and
it supports all, and only, the consequences of that option. Theorem 4 states that every
option has a corresponding naive extension. So, there is a bijection from the set of naive
extensions to the set of maximal options.
Theorem 4. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, and 4.
– For all O ∈ Max(Opt(T )), Arg(O) ∈ Extn(H).
– For all O ∈ Max(Opt(T )), O = Option(Arg(O))
– For all O,O′ ∈ Max(Opt(T )), if Arg(O) = Arg(O′) then O = O′.
Example 3 (Cont). The theory T3 has three options, of which only two are maximal:
Max(Opt(T )) = {O1,O3}. For all argumentation system H built over T3, if the attack
relation of H is to be conflict-dependent and the postulates satisfied, then Extn(H) =
{Arg(O1), Arg(O3)}.
It is thus possible to delimit the number of naive extensions of any argumentation
system that satisfies the four postulates.
Corollary 1. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, and 4. The equality |Extn(H)| =
|Max(Opt(T ))| holds.
What about the plausible conclusions that are drawn from a theory using an argu-
mentation system that satisfies the postulates? From the previous results, it is easy to
show that they are the literals that follow from all the maximal options.
Theorem 5. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Output(H) =
⋂
Oi∈Max(Opt(T ))
CN(Oi)
Example 3 (Cont). Any argumentation system H that can be built over the theory T3
and has a conflict-dependent attack relation and satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, 4 will
have as output the set Output(H) = CN(O1) ∩ CN(O2) = {p, q,¬s, u}.
4.2 Stable Semantics
We now analyze the outcomes of rule-based argumentation systems under stable se-
mantics, again considering only systems that satisfy the rationality postulates. We show
that such systems have stable extensions if the set of facts is not empty.
Theorem 6. Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory.Whenever H = (Arg(T ),R) is an AS
satisfying postulate 4, |Exts(H)| = 0 iff F = ∅.
As for naive extensions, stable extensions of any argumentation system that satisfies
the postulates return maximal options of the theory at hand.
Theorem 7. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS defined over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, 4. For all E ∈ Exts(H), ∃!O ∈
Max(Opt(T )) s.t.
– Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).
– E = Arg(O).
Two stable extensions capture distinct options.
Theorem 8. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS defined over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, 4.
For all E , E ′ ∈ Exts(H), if Option(E) = Option(E ′) then E = E ′.
Corollary 2. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS defined over a theory T = (F ,S,D)
s.t. F 6= ∅ and R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies Postulates 1,2,3,4. It holds that
1 ≤ |Exts(H)| ≤ |Max(Opt(T ))|.
Theorem 7 does not guarantee that each maximal option of a theory T has a corre-
sponding stable extension. The equality |Exts(H)| = |Max(Opt(T ))| depends on the
attack relation. Let ℜs be the set of all attack relations that are conflict-dependent and
that ensure Postulates 1, 2, 3, 4 under stable semantics. This set contains two disjoints
subsets of attack relations, i.e. ℜs = ℜs1 ∪ ℜs2 :
– ℜs1 : the relations s.t. |Exts(H)| < |Max(Opt(T ))|
– ℜs2 : the relations s.t. |Exts(H)| = |Max(Opt(T ))|
Systems that use relations in ℜs1 choose a proper subset of the maximal options of T
and make inferences from them. Their output sets are as follows:
Theorem 9. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory
T s.t. R ∈ ℜs1 . Output(H) =
⋂
Oi∈S
CN(Oi) with S = {Oi ∈ Max(Opt(T )) |
Arg(Oi) ∈ Exts(H)}.
These attack relations introduce a “critical discrimination” between the maximal op-
tions of a theory. Hence, great care must be exercised when designing rule-based argu-
mentation systems based on stable semantics: The principles governing the interaction
between ⇒ and R must be both rigorously and meticulously specified so as to avoid
trouble of which the following example is an easy case.
Example 5. Let T5 be s.t. F5 = {p, q} and S5 = ∅ and D5 = {p ⇒ s, q ⇒ ¬s}. T5
has two maximal options: O1 = (F5,S5, {p ⇒ s}) and O2 = (F5,S5, {q ⇒ ¬s}).
For any system H = (Arg(T5),R) s.t. R ∈ ℜs1 , either i) Exts(H) = {Arg(O1)} or
ii) Exts(H) = {Arg(O2)}. In case (i), s ∈ Output(H) and ¬s /∈ Output(H). In case
(ii), ¬s is the plausible conclusion. Either choice would be arbitrary.
Attack relations of category ℜs2 induce a bijection between the stable extensions of
an argumentation system and the maximal options of the theory over which it is built.
Theorem 10. Let T = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system over a theory T s.t.
R ∈ ℜs2. For all O ∈ Max(Opt(T )), Arg(O) ∈ Exts(H).
Argumentation systems with an attack relation from ℜs2 are coherent, meaning that
the preferred extensions exhaust all and only the stable ones.
Theorem 11. Let T = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system over a theory T s.t.
R ∈ ℜs2. Exts(H) = Extp(H) = Extn(H).
Attack relations in category ℜs2 conform exactly to the result obtained under naive
semantics: Plausible conclusions for them are already characterized in Theorem 5.
To sum up, attack relations satisfying the postulates can be split into two categories:
ℜs1 and ℜs2 . Relations from ℜs2 do not offer added value as they make the stable se-
mantics case to collapse to the naive semantics case. For stable semantics to substantiate
(as compared with naive semantics) a rule-based argumentation system, attack relations
from categoryℜs1 must be favored. However, pitfalls threaten as options are discarded,
and a lot of care must be exercised when designing such a system.
4.3 Preferred Semantics
Preferred semantics was initially proposed to overcome the limitation of stable seman-
tics which does not guarantee the existence of extensions. Indeed, any argumentation
system has at least one preferred extension which may be empty. We show that in case
of rule-based systems the empty set cannot be an extension.
Proposition 9. Let H be an AS built over a theory T = (F ,S,D) s.t. H satisfies strict
precedence. Extp(H) = {∅} iff F = ∅.
Unlike the cases of naive and stable extensions, a preferred extension may capture
only a sub-part of the consequences drawn from a maximal option.
Theorem 12. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS built over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent andH satisfies the postulates 1 and 3. For all E ∈ Extp(H), ∃O ∈ Max(Opt(T ))
s.t. Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O).
Two preferred extensions refer to different options.
Theorem 13. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies the postulates 1, 2, 3, and 4. Let E , E ′ ∈ Extp(H) and
O ∈ Max(Opt(T )). If Th(E) ⊑ O and Th(E ′) ⊑ O, then E = E ′.
From the previous result, it follows that the number of preferred extensions does not
exceed the number of maximal options of the theory over which the system is built.
Theorem 14. LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be a system built over a theory T s.t.R is conflict-
dependent and H satisfies Postulates 1, 2, 3, and 4. |Extp(H)| ≤ |Max(Opt(T ))|.
Regarding the outputs of a rule-based argumentation system under preferred seman-
tics, there are two cases: i) Attack relations of category Rs2 lead to coherent systems
whose plausible conclusions are characterized by Theorem 5. Thus, naive, stable and
preferred semantics coincide. ii) Attack relations of category Rs1 lead to pick up some
maximal options and to reason about them. The plausible conclusions are given by
Theorem 9. Thus the situation about preferred semantics is similar with that for stable
semantics: For preferred semantics to offer added value over naive semantics, the attack
relation chosen must discard some maximal options but it takes a lot of care to specify
such an attack relation in full generality.
4.4 Grounded Semantics – Ideal Semantics
This section analyses the outcomes of rule-based systems under grounded and ideal
semantics. We show that the ideal extension is exactly the set of arguments built from
the free part of a theory. The free part of a theory T = (F ,S,D), denoted by Free(T ),
is a sub-theory (F ,S,D′) where D′ = ∩Di where (F ,S,Di) ∈ Opt(T ). In other
words, D′ contains all the defeasible rules that are not involved in any conflict.
Proposition 10. Let T be a theory. CN(Free(T )) is consistent.
We show that when the attack relation satisfies a very natural requirement, then
Arg(Free(T )) is admissible (i.e., it is conflict-free and defends all its elements).
Definition 13. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS over a theory T . An attack relation R
privileges strict arguments iff for all a = (d, x), b = (d′, x′) ∈ Arg(T ), if a is strict
and Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d′) is inconsistent, then aRb.
As far as we know, all the attack relations in existing rule-based argumentation sys-
tems privilege strict arguments.
Theorem 15. LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be a system built over a theory T s.t.R is conflict-
dependent and privileges strict arguments. Arg(Free(T )) is admissible.
The set Arg(Free(T )) is part of every preferred extension.
Theorem 16. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS over a theory T s.t. R is conflict-
dependent and privileges strict arguments, and H satisfies Postulates 1, 3, 4.
Arg(Free(T )) ⊆
⋂
Ei∈Extp(H)
Ei.
We show next that in case of attack relations of category ℜs2, Arg(Free(T )) is
equal to the intersection of all preferred extensions. Recall that in this case, preferred
extensions coincide with stable extensions and with naive ones.
Theorem 17. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS over a theory T . If R ∈ ℜs2 then
Arg(Free(T )) =
⋂
Ei∈Extx(H)
Ei.
From the previous result, it follows that when the attack relation is of category ℜs2
and privileges strict arguments, then Arg(Free(T )) is the ideal extension.
Theorem 18. Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an AS over a theory T . If R ∈ ℜs2 and
privileges strict arguments, then
– Arg(Free(T )) is the ideal extension of H.
– The grounded extension of H is a subset of Arg(Free(T )).
The above result shows that ideal and grounded semantics allow the inference of
literals only from the free part of a theory. Note also that grounded extension is more
cautious than ideal one and may miss intuitive (free) conclusions.
5 Conclusion
The paper provides the first investigation on the outputs of rule-based argumentation
systems. The study is general in the sense that it keeps the attack relation unspecified.
Thus, the system can be instantiated with any of the attack relations that are used in
existing systems. The results show that under naive semantics, the systems return the
literals that follow from all the options of the theory at hand. Stable and preferred se-
mantics either do not provide an added value wrt naive semantics or the attack relation
of a system should be formalized in a very rigorous way in order to avoid arbitrary re-
sults. Ideal semantics returns the free part of a theory whereas the grounded semantics
returns a sub-part of the free part meaning that it may miss interesting conclusions.
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